In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A 1 × · · · × A m of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the issue of strategy-proofness in a voting model where agents vote for alternatives from several categories simultaneously. To be precise, the voters face m finite categories A k of alternatives (k = 1, . . . , m), and the purpose of the voting is to choose one element from the product set A = A 1 × · · · × A m . If these m choices are entirely independent, one can of course consider the choice from each category A k separately, and the strategy-proof voting procedures for such 1 "one-dimensional" social choice problems are well-known: when A k contains three or more eligible alternatives, then it follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 ) that only the dictatorial voting procedures are strategy-proof, and when A k contains exactly two eligible alternatives, then a voting procedure is strategy-proof if and only if it is "voting by committees" (see Barberà et al. (1991) ). In this study, however, we consider the simultaneous choice from m categories because we want to allow explicitly for the possibility that these m choices cannot be made completely independently, but that they must be coordinated to some extent.
Such a need for coordination can come up for different reasons, as illustrated by the following examples. First, one of the most common reasons is that the overall choice from the product set must be balanced in some sense. This can either be due to exogenous constraints such as budget restrictions; for example, if the categories A k represent levels of spending on different parts of the public sector such as infrastructure, public education, health care, etc., then budget limitations will usually exclude the simultaneous choice of expensive alternatives from several categories. Or it can be the consequence of fundamental values among the voters which are incorporated in the voting procedure; for example, if a committee has to decide how m open positions at a department (which are represented by the m categories A k ) are to be filled, and if an even distribution of sex or age of the staff is considered important, then the committee will probably want to use a voting procedure that will avoid unbalanced outcomes. Second, another important reason for coordination may be that certain categories are complementary to some extent. For example, if a laboratory must decide between different research projects (which correspond to the alternatives in A 1 ), employ a research manager (A 2 ), choose among different kinds of equipment (A 3 ), etc., then each alternative in A 1 will typically be meaningful only with certain choices from A 2 and A 3 , but not with others. Finally, a third important reason for coordination we want to mention here is that, in many societies, basic constitutional principles put restrictions on laws and necessitate coordination. This is the case, for example, when a parliament has to decide what civil rights to assign to different groups in the society, which are distinguished by characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, etc. In this case, A k consists of different possible bundles of rights for group k (e.g., no rights, basic level of rights, full rights including franchise, membership in social security and pension system, etc.). According to many constitutions, the assignment of civil rights must inter alia be such that citizens get at least as many rights as residents without citizenship, and if two groups differ only in gender, then these two groups must receive the same bundle of rights.
The need for coordination can thus be of very different nature, but from a gen-eral perspective, coordination across different categories always means that certain combinations of alternatives are excluded from being elected. Formally, this means that the set of all feasible outcomes of the voting is in general not the entire product set A = A 1 × · · · × A m , but rather a proper subset of it, and in our voting model, the range of the voting can be any arbitrary non-empty subset of A.
If the voters can rank the possible outcomes of such a constrained multiple good voting in any conceivable way, then it follows, again by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, that only the dictatorial voting procedures are strategy-proof, at least if there are more than two possible outcomes. But when eligible alternatives are multiple public goods, as in the model in this paper, it is common to assume that voters' preferences over A = A 1 × · · · × A m in addition to being rational also exhibit some kind of separability structure. In the literature on multiple public good votings, one finds mainly three different types of separability assumptions on voters' preferences, namely weak separability, complete separability, and additivity, and we will consider our voting model for all of these three preference structures.
The discussion so far indicates that two factors are central for our considerations: on the one hand the structure of the set of feasible outcomes of a voting, and on the other hand the structure of individual preferences. In our analysis it will turn out that the extent to which it is possible to construct strategy-proof voting procedures for constrained multiple public good votings depends crucially on these two factors and their interplay. In the literature closest to this paper, the role of these two factors has been analyzed in the two papers Barberà et al. (2005) and Svensson and Torstensson (2008) , both of which consider basically the same voting model as in our study, but under additional assumptions on the cardinality of the categories A k . Barberà et al. (2005) characterize all strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs) for constrained multiple public good votings for both additive and weakly separable preferences under the assumption that every category A k contains exactly two alternatives. Svensson and Torstensson (2008) assume instead that every category A k contains at least three alternatives, and they provide a complete characterization of all strategy-proof SCFs for completely separable preferences. There is, of course, an obvious theoretical interest in finding corresponding characterizations for the general case (i.e., without any restrictions on the number of alternatives in the categories A k ); besides, the examples above indicate that the cardinality restrictions in these previous results can not generally be expected to be satisfied. The purpose of this paper is to remove these cardinality restrictions and to characterize all strategy-proof SCFs for constrained multiple public good votings for weakly separable, completely separable and additive preferences, without imposing any additional assumptions.
Our characterization of the strategy-proof SCFs is based on a description of the range of the SCFs. Thereby, we make extensive use of the following result from Svensson and Torstensson (2008) , which allows us to express the functional structure of the strategy-proof SCFs in an easily understandable way: If f is an SCF whose range R f is a subset of the product set A = A 1 × · · · × A m , then there is a unique maximal decomposition R f = B 1 × · · · × B q of the range into q ≤ m components. In order to construct non-dictatorial strategy-proof SCFs for multiple public good votings, it is natural to try to divide the choice from the entire product set A into a number of independent choices from subcollections of categories A k , and the maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q provides the upper bound for how far the choice can be decomposed.
When preferences are additive or completely separable, voters consider the elements in each component B j independently of the other components. For these preference structures, we can show (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) that an SCF f is strategy-proof if and only if f can be decomposed into q independent choices from the q components B j in the maximal range decomposition of f , and the choice from every component B j is made in a strategy-proof way. To be precise, f is strategyproof if and only if f is dictatorial on every component B j with three or more elements (where different such components can have different dictators), and voting by committees on every component B j with two elements. In particular, this means that the purely dictatorial result from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be avoided when the maximal range decomposition of f contains at least two components. Our characterization of the strategy-proof SCFs for additive and completely separable preferences may appear intuitive, but it can not be obtained by applying the standard results for strategy-proof voting procedures to each of the components B j in the maximal range decomposition because if such a component covers two or more of the categories in the product set A, then the domain of (marginal) preferences on this component is not unrestricted, and therefore it is not a priori obvious which SCFs are strategy-proof on B j . Instead, we present a proof technique that allows us to simplify the structure of the domain of marginal preferences on every component B j considerably, and we hope that this proof strategy will turn out to be fruitful in connection with other problems as well.
When preferences are weakly separable, we require only that voters rank the alternatives in every category A k independently of the other categories, but the same need no longer be true for the elements in a component B j . But if the voters' rankings of the elements in a component B j depend on which elements are chosen from the other components, then it is intuitively reasonable that every non-dictatorial decomposed SCF will provide incentives for strategic voting. This is indeed the case, and we show that, for all non-trivial range restrictions, only the dictatorial SCFs are strategy-proof (Theorem 3), which means that we get back to the conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem when preferences are weakly separable. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the social choice model. Section 3 provides our characterizations of strategy-proof SCFs for constrained multiple good votings for the three cases when voters' preferences are either additive, completely separable, or weakly separable. Section 4, finally, contains a discussion of the related literature and some concluding comments. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 The social choice model and some important results from the literature
The basic model
The basic formal framework of this study is as follows: Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite society of n individuals, who consider a finite set A of social alternatives. The individuals have complete, transitive, and asymmetric 1 preferences over the alternatives in A, and the preference of individual i is denoted by P i . The set of all admissible preferences over A is denoted by P A , and P A is referred to as the preference domain; normally, P A will be a proper subset of the set of all complete, transitive, and asymmetric preferences. If P ∈ P A and B ⊂ A is a subset of A, then τ B (P) denotes the (unique) maximal element of P in B, i.e., τ B (P) ∈ B and τ B (P) P b for all b ∈ B \ {τ B (P)}; in particular, τ A (P) is the unrestricted maximal element of P in A. The preferences of the n individuals are collected in a (preference) profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A , and the profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) is sometimes, in order to focus on individual i's preference, rewritten as (P i , P −i ), where P −i ∈ P n−1 A thus denotes the profile of all individuals except individual i.
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : P n A → A which assigns to every profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A a unique social choice a ∈ A. For a given SCF f , the set of all alternatives which can be attained by f is denoted by R f , i.e., R f = {a ∈ A; a = f (P 1 , . . . , P n ) for some (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A }, and R f is called the range of f . An SCF f : P n A → A is manipulable at the profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A if there is some i ∈ N and some P i ∈ P A such that f (P i , P −i ) P i f (P i , P −i ). If f cannot be manipulated at any admissible profile, then f is strategy-proof. Finally, f : P n A → A is dictatorial 1 A preference P on A is complete if for all a, a ∈ A, a = a , either a P a or a P a; P is transitive if a P a and a P a implies a P a for all a, a , a ∈ A; finally, P is asymmetric if, for all a, a ∈ A, a P a implies that a P a does not hold.
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if there is some i ∈ N such that f (P i , P −i ) = τ R f (P i ) for all (P i , P −i ) ∈ P n A . In this formal framework, the theoretical starting point for our study is the wellknown Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 ).
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Let A be a finite set of alternatives, and suppose that the preference domain P A consists of all complete, transitive, and asymmetric preferences over A. Then f : P n A → A with #R f ≥ 3 is strategy-proof if and only if f is dictatorial.
The model with multiple public goods
The basic model is now extended by imposing a product set structure on the set of alternatives. To be precise, there are m < ∞ finite and non-empty categories A k (1 ≤ k ≤ m), indexed by the set M = {1, . . . , m}, and the set of alternatives is A = ∏ k∈M A k . Thus, an alternative is now an m-tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) of m public goods, and if a ∈ A, then a k ∈ A k denotes the public good in a which is chosen from category k. If S ⊂ M is a non-empty subset of the set of coordinate indices, we denote by A S the product set of the corresponding categories, i.e., A S = ∏ k∈S A k . The projection from A onto A S is denoted by π A S : A → A S , so for a ∈ A, π A S (a) is the suballocation of a which belongs to the categories corresponding to S; for the special case when S = {k} for some k ∈ M, we write π A k instead of π A {k} . If a ∈ A and S ⊂ M, we can decompose a as a = (a S , a −S ), where a S = π A S (a) and a −S = π A M\S (a), and in the special case when S = {k}, we write a = (a k , a −k ).
Consider now the preference domain P A . When A is a product set, it is often reasonable to assume that not all conceivable preferences over A belong to P A , but that P A instead exhibits a structure which takes the product set structure of A into account. In the literature, there are mainly three types of preference domains which are commonly considered:
(1) Additive preferences. A complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference
The set of all additive preferences over A is denoted by P add A . (2) Completely separable preferences. Given a non-empty collection S ⊂ M of categories, a complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference P on A = ∏ k∈M A k is separable with respect to S if the ranking of P of the elements in A S is independent of the categories M \ S. Formally, P is separable with respect to S if for all a, a ∈ A, we have (a S , a −S ) P (a S , a −S ) if and only if (a S , a −S ) P (a S , a −S ). If P is separable with respect to S, then P induces a well-defined preference on A S , called the marginal preference of P on A S and denoted by π A S (P), which satisfies a S π A S (P) a S for a S , a S ∈ A S if and only if (a S , a −S ) P (a S , a −S ) for some a −S ∈ A M\S . A preference P on A is completely separable if P is separable with respect to every non-empty subset S ⊂ M, and the set of all completely separable preferences on A is denoted by P cs A . (3) Weakly separable preferences. A complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference P on A = ∏ k∈M A k is weakly separable if the ranking of the alternatives in every category A k is independent of the categories M \ {k}, i.e., if P is separable with respect to {k} for every k ∈ M. The set of all weakly separable preferences on A is denoted by P ws A . From these definitions it follows immediately that P add A ⊂ P cs A ⊂ P ws A . However, the converse inclusions do not hold in general: Bradley et al. (2005) show that the inclusion P add A ⊂ P cs A is strict if A contains m ≥ 5 categories with #A k ≥ 2, 2 and the following example illustrates why the inclusion P cs A ⊂ P ws A is strict whenever m ≥ 3.
. If the preference P on A is such that
then it is easily checked that the utility function u(a) = 4a 1 + 2a 2 + a 3 represents P, so P is additive and hence also completely and weakly separable. On the other hand, if P is defined by
then in every category, 1 is preferred to 0 for every fixed pair of alternatives from the other two categories, and hence P is weakly separable. But the ranking of the pairs (0, 1) and (1, 0) in the first two categories depends on whether the third coordinate is 0 or 1, and therefore P is neither completely separable nor additive.
Example 1 can also be used to explain the differences between the three domains P ws A , P cs A , and P add A in a more intuitive way. Suppose for example that the three categories in A = {0, 1} 3 correspond to three candidates under consideration for employment, and a k = 1 indicates that candidate k is employed, while a k = 0 represents the opposite. In this context, weak separability means that each candidate is evaluated independently of whether the other candidates are employed; this condition is met both in (1) and (2), where all three candidates are considered appropriate for employment. Complete separability requires here that, in addition, the 2 In a classical paper, Debreu (1959) showed however that in the "continuous" case, for example when A = R m + and preferences are continuous, the identity P add A = P cs A holds.
relative ranking of any two candidates does not depend on whether the third candidate is employed; for example, in (1), candidate 1 is unambiguously preferred to candidate 2 in the sense that both (1, 0, 0) P (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 1) P (0, 1, 1). This requirement may be violated if there is some interplay between the candidates; for example, if candidate 1 is considered more skilled than candidate 2, but candidate 2 is able to cooperate much more efficiently with candidate 3, then it is possible that (0, 1, 1) P (1, 0, 1) despite (1, 0, 0) P (0, 1, 0), as in (2) where the preference is only weakly, but not completely separable. Finally, if preferences are completely separable, it is often convenient to impose also the structure of additivity as a technical assumption to obtain a tractable representation of preferences.
The maximal range decomposition and some special SCFs
Consider now an SCF f : P n A → A. It is of course possible that the range of f equals the entire product set A but, for reasons illustrated in the introduction, it is also of particular interest to consider the case when R f is a proper subset of A, and therefore we now describe the structure of subsets of A. If B ⊂ A is a proper subset of the product set A, then B can also be considered as a product set, simply because the entire set B can be seen as a product set with only one factor, but in many cases there exists a product set decomposition B = B 1 × · · · × B q of B into q components B j (1 ≤ j ≤ q) which is finer than the one-factor product set B, but coarser than the complete decomposition into m factors. Formally, that B 1 × · · · × B q is a decomposition of B means that for every B j ( j = 1, . . . , q) there exists a corresponding set of coordinates 
In some cases, B is its own maximal decomposition (i.e.,q = 1), and then B is called indecomposable; for example, B = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} is an indecomposable subset of A = {0, 1} × {0, 1}. At the other extreme, the maximal decomposition of a subset can have at most q = m components, which of course is the case when B = A, but this can also happen for proper subsets of A: for example, B = {0, 1} × {0} is a proper subset of A = {0, 1} × {0, 1} with q = m = 2. The following example illustrates the maximal decomposition of a subset in a non-trivial case.
Example 2. Let A = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, and set B = A \ {(1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}.
This means that B is obtained by excluding exactly those two alternatives from A whose first two coordinates are (1, 1). Thus, we have the decomposition B = B 1 ×B 2 where B 1 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} and B 2 = {0, 1}, with C(B 1 ) = {1, 2} and C(B 2 ) = {3}. Since it is not possible to decompose B further, B 1 × B 2 is the unique maximal decomposition of B.
In connection with product set decompositions, we will also use the following notation: if B 1 × · · · × B q is a decomposition of a subset B ⊂ A, then we denote by π B j the projection of A onto the categories covered by B j , i.e., π B j = π A C(B j ) , and the complementary projection is denoted by π −B j , i.e., π −B j = π A M\C(B j ) .
In addition to the types of separable preferences defined above, we will also use the following notion to indicate when the separability of a preference is compatible with a decomposition of a subset B of A: a preference P on A is component-wise separable with respect to the decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q of B ⊂ A if P is separable with respect to C(B j ) for every j = 1, . . . , q.
We now define some special functional forms of SCFs for multiple public good votings. If the set of feasible alternatives is a proper subset of A = ∏ k∈M A k , then it is in general not possible to decompose the voting completely in the sense that the individuals in the society make independent choices from the m categories, because this may lead to infeasible alternatives. But if the set of feasible alternatives is decomposed as B 1 × · · · × B q , then society can choose without restrictions from every component B j , and the choices from the different components can be combined in any conceivable way. Consider now f : P n A → A, and let R f = B 1 × · · · × B q be some decomposition of R f , which is not necessarily maximal. We say that f is dictatorial on a component B j if there is some individual i, called the dictator on B j ,
A . It is possible that f is dictatorial on some components B j but not on others, and two components B j and B j can have different individuals as dictators. If the same individual i is a dictator on every component B j ( j = 1, . . . , q), then f is of course dictatorial in the usual sense.
For components with exactly two elements, one can define the following special form of voting rule: If #B j = 2 for some B j in R f = B 1 ×· · ·×B q , i.e., B j = {b 1 j , b 2 j }, then f : P n A → A is voting by committees on B j if there exist two non-empty families
of non-empty subsets of N, called the winning coalitions for b 1 j and b 2 j , such that for s = 1, 2 and all (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A , we have . Intuitively, coalition monotonicity means that increasing the support for a certain alternative must not worsen that alternative's chances to be elected. A common example of voting by committees is voting by quota, where one of the alternatives, say b 1 j , needs to get the support of a quota Q ∈ [0, 1] from the individuals to be elected, i.e., I ∈ W b 1 j if and only if #I/n ≥ Q, and the special case Q = 1/2 corresponds of course to the majority rule. Another example of voting by committees is obtained when f is dictatorial on B j with individual i being the dictator, and in this case I ∈ W b s j if and only if {i} ⊂ I (s = 1, 2). For the case when # A k = 2 for all k ∈ M, the domain P A is either the domain of additive or weakly separable preferences, and f : P n A → A is onto, Barberà et al. (1991) have shown that f is strategy-proof if and only if f is voting by committees on every A k .
We conclude this section with a result from the literature which characterizes all strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of additive preferences in the presence of arbitrary range restrictions, but under the additional requirement that every category contains exactly two alternatives, and this result will be used in the following analysis.
Barberà et al. (2005, Theorem 1)
4 Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of alternatives with #A k = 2 for all k ∈ M. An SCF f : (P add A ) n → A is strategy-proof if and only if f has the following properties with respect to its maximal range decomposition
4 We have reformulated this result in the language of our model in order to apply and generalize this result appropriately. In the original voting model in Barberà et al. (2005) , society must choose a subset of a set of m different objects under the constraint that not all possible subsets are feasible. Identifying each subset of the m objects with a binary m-dimensional characteristic vector, this voting problem of course turns out to be equivalent to choosing one element from the product set A = {0, 1} m . Further, the terminology in Barberà et al. (2005) translates as follows: sections and active components in Barberà et al. (2005) are called components B j and elements in B j respectively in our model, and for the range of the SCF, Barberà et al. (2005) obtain a minimal Cartesian decomposition (in the sense that no section can be decomposed further), which corresponds to our maximal range decomposition (where "maximal" refers to the number of components). Moreover, in Barberà et al. (2005) , the SCF is defined by coordinate-wise voting with coordination conditions on the winning coalitions in order to meet the range restrictions, while we define the SCF component-wise, which makes the coordination conditions redundant.
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods under range restrictions
We now provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof SCFs for multiple public good votings with arbitrary range restrictions for the three cases when preferences are additive, component-wise separable, or weakly separable.
Additive preferences
For the domain of additive preferences, Theorem 1 in Barberà et al. (2005) provides, under the additional assumption that every category contains exactly two alternatives, the complete characterization of the strategy-proof SCFs for constrained multiple public good votings cited in the previous section. It turns out that the same characterization also holds in the absence of the restriction #A k = 2 (k ∈ M), and we have the following result. Theorem 1. Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of m finite categories A k . An SCF f : (P add A ) n → A is strategy-proof if and only if f has the following properties with respect to its maximal range decomposition
Theorem 1 states that a strategy-proof SCF f : (P add A ) n → A with maximal range decomposition R f = B 1 × · · · × B q must be component-wise decomposable in the sense that the choice from every component depends only on the individuals' marginal preferences over that component, which of course are well-defined when preferences are additive. Moreover, in order to obtain strategy-proofness for the entire choice from R f , it is necessary and sufficient that the choice on every component is strategy-proof according to the results for "one-dimensional" votings, which means that f must be voting by committees on components with two elements and dictatorial on components with three or more elements. Note, however, that the second part of this result does not follow directly from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem because if #C(B j ) ≥ 2, then additivity of preferences implies that the domain of marginal preferences on B j is not unrestricted, and hence the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem cannot be applied to components with three or more elements. Instead, Theorem 1 can be derived from the corresponding result in Barberà et al. (2005) when the choice problem in Theorem 1 is reformulated in a convenient way, which is explained in the following example. In the formal proof of Theorem 1, which is provided in the appendix, the arguments from Example 3 are made rigorous and general.
Example 3. Consider the product set A = A 1 × A 2 × A 3 , where A k = {a k1 , a k2 , a k3 } for k = 1, 2, 3. To rewrite the social choice problem of choosing one alternative from A into a multiple binary choice problem, start by identifying the alternatives in each category A k with binary unit vectors of length three as follows:
Then every a ∈ A can be identified with a binary vector of length nine by joining the binary unit vectors corresponding to its three coordinates; for example, a = (a 12 , a 23 , a 31 ) will correspond to (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0). In this way, A can be identified with a proper subset of the binary product setĀ = {0, 1} 9 . Next, ifP is a preference onĀ, we associateP with that preference P on A which ranks the alternatives in A in the same way asP ranks the corresponding alternatives inĀ. 5 Thereby, the additive preferences onĀ will be associated with additive preferences on A: IfP ∈ P add A is represented by the utility functionū = ∑ 9 l=1ū l , define the utility function u : A → R by letting u(a) be equal to the utility assigned byū to the alternative inĀ which corresponds to a ∈ A. For example, if a = (a 12 , a 23 , a 31 ), set
It is easily checked that u is an additive representation of the preference P on A which corresponds toP. For any given SCF f : (P add A ) n → A, we can now define a corresponding SCFf : (P add A ) n →Ā as follows: If (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) ∈ (P add A ) n , and (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ (P add A ) n is a preference profile which corresponds to (P 1 , . . . ,P n ), then we letf (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) be that alternative inĀ which corresponds to f (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ A.
Suppose now, as a concrete example, that f :
Then the maximal range decomposition of f is of course B 1 × B 2 , where B 1 = (A 1 × A 2 ) \ {(a 11 , a 21 )} and B 2 = A 3 \ {a 33 }. The SCFf : (P add A ) n →Ā, which corresponds to f , is also strategy-proof and has the maximal range decomposition Rf =B 1 ×B 2 , where, using the abbreviationÂ = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)},
By Theorem 1 in Barberà et al. (2005) ,f is dictatorial onB 1 and voting by committees onB 2 , and translating this functional structure to f gives that f must be dictatorial on B 1 and voting by committees on B 2 . Remark 1. In Theorem 1, the functional form of f is formulated in such a way that the individuals vote for the elements in the components B j . Alternatively, it would be possible to express the functional form of f in terms of how the individuals vote for the m categories A k in A, but this would require introducing coordination conditions which ensure the feasibility of the overall outcome. Such coordination conditions are not uncommon in the literature on constrained multiple public good votings, but unfortunately they tend to be rather complicated. If the choice of f , as here, is described in terms of the components B j , feasibility of the overall outcome is automatically guaranteed, and the characterization of f becomes more transparent and understandable.
Component-wise separable preferences
Intuitively, the characterization of strategy-proof SCFs in Theorem 1 as componentwise decomposable rules should not depend ultimately on the additivity of preferences, but rather on the fact that marginal preferences are well-defined for every component B j . The next theorem states that component-wise separability of preferences is indeed a sufficient condition to obtain the same decomposability characterization of strategy-proof SCFs as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of m finite categories A k . Let P A be a domain of complete, transitive, and asymmetric preferences over A such that P add A ⊂ P A . Let further f : P n A → A be an SCF with maximal range decomposition R f = B 1 × · · · × B q , and assume that every P ∈ P A is component-wise separable with respect to B 1 × · · · × B q . Then f is strategy-proof if and only if f satisfies: (1) If #B j = 2, then f is voting by committees on B j (1 ≤ j ≤ q).
(2) If #B j ≥ 3, then f is dictatorial on B j (1 ≤ j ≤ q).
The assumption P add A ⊂ P A is a richness condition which allows us to use Theorem 1 in the proof of Theorem 2. Without this condition, the class of strategy-proof SCFs may be larger than specified by Theorem 2. 6 For the domain P cs A of all completely separable preferences, the assumptions of Theorem 2 are of course always satisfied, regardless of the structure of the maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q , which leads to the following corollary. 6 If P A is a domain of component-wise separable preferences, it is straightforward to check that any SCF f : P n A → A, which is voting by committees on components with two elements and dictatorial on components with at least three elements, is strategy-proof, even if P add A ⊂ P A . But if P add A ⊂ P A , there may be additional strategy-proof SCFs; for example, if P A only contains component-wise separable preferences which also are multi-dimensional single-peaked as defined in Barberà et al. (1997) , then it follows from Barberà et al. (1997) that there also exist strategy-proof SCFs f : P n A → A which are generalized median voter schemes.
Corollary 1. Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of m finite categories A k . An SCF f : (P cs A ) n → A is strategy-proof if and only if f has the following properties with respect to its maximal range decomposition R f = B 1 × · · · × B q : (1) If #B j = 2, then f is voting by committees on B j (1 ≤ j ≤ q).
Remark 2. Corollary 1 confirms a conjecture made in the concluding discussion in Svensson and Torstensson (2008) : The main result in that paper provides a characterization of all strategy-proof SCFs f : (P cs A ) n → A under the additional assumptions that #A k ≥ 3 for every k ∈ M and that f is weakly onto in the sense that every alternative in every category is elected at least at some profile (formally, this means {π A k (a); a ∈ R f } = A k for every k ∈ M). With these assumptions, every component in the maximal range decomposition of f satisfies #B j ≥ 3, and Svensson and Torstensson (2008) obtain a component-wise dictatorial result which corresponds to case (2) in Corollary 1. However, they conjecture that in the absence of their additional assumptions, Corollary 1 should hold.
Weakly separable preferences
For weakly separable preferences, Theorem 2 in Barberà et al. (2005) characterizes completely the strategy-proof SCFs for constrained multiple public good votings under the restriction that #A k = 2 for every k ∈ M. The following result provides the corresponding characterization for the general case, i.e., without making any assumptions on the cardinality of A k except finiteness.
Theorem 3. Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of m finite categories A k . An SCF f : (P ws A ) n → A is strategy-proof if and only if f has the following properties with respect to its maximal range decomposition R f = B 1 × · · · × B q : (1) If q = m, then f is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, (1 ≤ j ≤ q).
(2) If q < m and #R f ≥ 3, then f is dictatorial.
Part (1) of Theorem 3 follows of course as a special case from Theorem 2. Part (2) states that if preferences are weakly separable, then, in the case of a non-trivial range restriction (i.e., q < m), it is no longer possible to construct a strategy-proof SCF by composing it of component-wise strategy-proof rules, but instead there must be a single dictator on the entire range of the SCF. The intuition for this purely dictatorial result is explained in the following example.
Example 4. Let A = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, and suppose that f : (P ws A ) 2 → A is a strategy-proof two-person SCF with range R f = A \ {(1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}. By Example 2, the maximal decomposition of R f is B 1 ×B 2 where B 1 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} and B 2 = {0, 1}. Since P cs A ⊂ P ws A , we can consider the restriction of f to profiles of completely separable preferences; denote this restriction byf . By Corollary 1,f is dictatorial on B 1 and voting by committees on B 2 , but suppose here for simplicity thatf is also dictatorial on B 2 . If B 1 and B 2 have the same individual as dictator, thenf is dictatorial, and from standard extension arguments it follows then that also f is dictatorial. This is, however, the only possible scenario here because if B 1 and B 2 have different dictators underf , then it is possible to construct a profile at which f is manipulable, which is explained in the following. Assume therefore that individual 1 is the dictator associated with B 1 , while individual 2 is the dictator on B 2 . Allow now individual 1 to extend his preference to P ws A , while individual 2's preference still belongs to P cs A ; in particular, this means that the maximal element of P 1 in B 1 may now depend on whether 0 or 1 is chosen from B 2 . For such profiles (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ P ws A × P cs A , the choice from B 2 must still be individual 2's maximal element in B 2 : If there were some (P 1 ,P 2 ) ∈ P ws A × P cs A such that π B 2 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B 2 (τ R f (P 2 )), then individual 1 would be able to manipulate f at every profile
For the choice from B 1 , this has the following implication: If (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ P ws A × P cs A , then π B 1 ( f (P 1 , P 2 )) must be individual 1's maximal element in B 1 conditional on the choice made by individual 2 in B 2 , because otherwise individual 1 could manipulate f by representing some P 1 ∈ P cs A which ranks this conditional maximal element at the (unconditional) top.
Consider now the profile (P 1 ,P 2 ), whereP 1 andP 2 are defined as follows (the alternatives which do not belong to R f have been overlined):
(1, 1, 1)P 1 (0, 1, 1)P 1 (1, 0, 1)P 1 (0, 0, 1)P 1
(1, 1, 0)P 1 (1, 0, 0)P 1 (0, 1, 0)P 1 (0, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 1)P 2 (1, 1, 0)P 2 (1, 0, 1)P 2 (1, 0, 0)P 2 (0, 1, 1)P 2 (0, 1, 0)P 2 (0, 0, 1)P 2 (0, 0, 0) By Example 1,P 1 ∈ P ws A \ P cs A andP 2 ∈ P cs A . From the preceding paragraph, we get first π B 2 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B 2 (τ R f (P 2 )) = 1, and given that 1 is chosen from B 2 , individual 1's most preferred element in B 1 is (0, 1), so π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = (0, 1). Thus, f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = (0, 1, 1). But now individual 2 can manipulate f : IfP 2 ∈ P cs A is some completely separable preference with π B 2 (τ R f (P 2 )) = 0, then π B 2 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = 0 and hence π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = (1, 0), so f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = (1, 0, 0); since (1, 0, 0)P 2 (0, 1, 1), this means that individual 2 can manipulate f at (P 1 ,P 2 ) viaP 2 . Thus, f can only be strategy-proof if the restriction of f to completely separable preferences has the same individual as dictator on B 1 and B 2 , and it is then straightforward to show that this dictatorship extends to f itself.
The reason for individual 2's manipulation opportunity at (P 1 ,P 2 ) should now be clear: f can only be strategy-proof if the choice in B 1 is the most preferred alternative of individual 1 given the choice of individual 2 in B 2 , but if individual 1's most preferred alternative in B 1 depends on the choice in B 2 , which is possible here because B 1 covers more than one category and preferences need only be weakly separable, then this dependency makes it possible for individual 2 to influence the choice in B 1 and hence also to manipulate f . Note that the inversion of individual 1's most preferred element in B 1 , which is crucial for the argument above, is only possible when individual 1's unrestricted top element from the first two categories (in this example the pair (1, 1)) is excluded from the range of f ; in particular, this means that if there are no range restrictions (i.e., R f = A), then the manipulation opportunity indicated above will not exist. , where #A k = 2, using the binary transformation which allowed us to derive our result for additive preferences from the corresponding result in Barberà et al. (2005) as illustrated in Example 3. The reason is the following: In Example 3, we started by identifying the set of alternatives A = A 1 × A 2 × A 3 with a subset of the binary product setĀ = {0, 1} 9 . IfP is now a weakly separable preference onĀ, thenP ranks each of the nine coordinates inĀ independently of the other coordinates, but the same is not necessarily true for example for the collection of the first three coordinates inĀ, which correspond to the category A 1 , and henceP does not necessarily correspond to a weakly separable preference on A. Therefore, the set of all preferences on A, which correspond to weakly separable preferences onĀ, is a strict super-domain of P ws A , and the dictatorial result for the former domain, which can be obtained from Barberà et al. (2005, Theorem 2), cannot be used to infer the dictatorial result for the smaller domain P ws A . Instead, the proof of Theorem 3 is based on the ideas outlined in Example 4.
We conclude this section with two examples which illustrate how our results can be applied.
Example 5. Suppose that A = ∏ k∈M A k is a product set, and let B = A \ {a} for some a ∈ A. This special form of range restriction has been considered in Aswal et al. (2003) , who show, using their criterion of linked domains, that if A k = {0, 1} for every k ∈ M (in their paper, every category A k corresponds to one of m candidates, which can be either elected or not elected) and preferences are weakly separable, then every strategy-proof SCF f : (P ws A ) n → A whose range equals B must be dictatorial. However, B is obviously indecomposable, and therefore it follows directly from our results that under the assumptions in Aswal et al. (2003) there is no nondictatorial strategy-proof SCF with range B, and moreover, this dictatorial result also holds when #A k ≥ 2 (k ∈ M) and also when preferences are completely separable or additive.
Example 6. Aswal et al. (2003) also consider the following slightly more complicated range restriction: There are again m candidates (i.e., A k = {0, 1} for k ∈ M), but the range is now B = {a ∈ A = ∏ k∈M A k , K 1 ≤ ∑ k∈M a k ≤ K 2 }, where K 1 , K 2 are integers such that 0 < K 1 ≤ K 2 < m, which means that the number of elected candidates must be between K 1 and K 2 . This kind of range restriction occurs for example when an understaffed department wants to employ at least K 1 new researchers and, due to budget restrictions, at most K 2 researchers can be employed. Using the criterion of linked domains, Aswal et al. (2003) show that there is no non-dictatorial strategy-proof SCF f : (P ws A ) n → A with range B. With our results, this dictatorial result can be established in a more general setting: Let A = ∏ k∈M A k be a product set of integer intervals A k = [α k , α k ] = {α k , α k + 1, . . . , α k }, and let B = {a ∈ A; K 1 ≤ ∑ k∈M a k ≤ K 2 }, where ∑ k∈M α k ≤ K 1 ≤ K 2 ≤ ∑ k∈M α k with at least two of the inequalities being strict. Then B is indecomposable 7 , and it follows hence from our results that if P A is the domain of weakly separable, completely separable or additive preferences over A, then there is no non-dictatorial strategy-proof SCF f : P n A → A with range B.
Related literature and concluding comments
The issue of strategy-proofness in multiple public good votings has been studied from different perspectives in a number of papers in the literature. The most fun- 7 The indecomposability of B can be shown as follows: We have ∑ k∈M α k < K j < ∑ k∈M α k either for j = 1 or j = 2, and suppose that this condition holds here for j = 2 (the case j = 1 is symmetric). Suppose that B = B 1 ×B 2 , and let a = (b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ B 1 ×B 2 be such that
Assume that the latter two inequalities hold. Construct now a = (b 1 , b 2 ) by increasing one of the coordinates in b 1 by 1 and decreasing one of the coordinates in b 2 by 1. Then
Thus, B cannot be decomposed as a product set.
damental papers in this area, among which Border and Jordan (1983) , Barberà et al. (1991) , Le Breton and Sen (1999) , Le Breton and Weymark (1999) , Weymark (1999) , and Nehring and Puppe (2007) should be mentioned, consider voting models where preferences are separable and the range is unrestricted (i.e., R f = A), and the papers differ mainly in their assumptions on the form of separability and on the cardinality of the categories A k . The main common finding in these papers is that strategy-proof SCFs with full range must be decomposable across the categories A k and strategy-proof on every category. The basic model for multiple public good votings has then been modified in different ways, and our study contributes to a variant of the model where preferences are still separable, but the range is now allowed to be restricted. A first contribution in this direction is Aswal et al. (2003) , who consider the two special cases of range restrictions which were explained and generalized in Example 5 and 6. Barberà et al. (2005) and Svensson and Torstensson (2008) are so far the most general papers on multiple public good votings under constraints, in the sense that all possible kinds of range restrictions are allowed, but both papers impose additional assumptions on the cardinality of the categories A k . In the literature, these two papers are closest to our study, and from the discussion in the introduction and in the preceding section it should be clear how our results are related to and generalize the results in these two papers.
Another interesting way of modifying the basic model for multiple public good votings is to keep the full range assumption, but to impose a structure other than separability on preferences. In this context, special attention has been given to multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences, and here we find the important contributions by Barberà et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1997) . In Barberà et al. (1993) , the set A of alternatives is a discrete multi-dimensional grid, and singlepeaked preferences P are defined by the condition that if a, b ∈ A are such that a belongs to the minimal box spanned by τ A (P) and b, then a P b; in this framework, an SCF is strategy-proof if and only if it is category-wise decomposable and a generalized median voter scheme on every category. Chichilnisky and Heal (1997) consider instead a continuous m-dimensional set of alternatives on which single-peaked preferences are symmetric in the sense that indifference curves are ellipsoids; strategyproof SCFs are coordinate-wise decomposable, and they are characterized as locally constant or dictatorial rules.
Finally, it is of course possible to combine multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences with range restrictions, which has been done in Serizawa (1996) and Barberà et al. (1997 Barberà et al. ( , 1998 . Serizawa (1996) considers component-wise singlepeaked preferences and a special form of range restrictions, which occur as a con-sequence of limited production resources in the economy, and strategy-proof SCFs are found to be generalized schemes of voting by committees. Barberà et al. (1997) start with the same assumptions as in Barberà et al. (1993) , but now all kinds of range restrictions are allowed, and strategy-proof SCFs are characterized as generalized median voter schemes on every dimension together with a condition, the intersection property, which ensures the feasibility of elected alternatives. Barberà et al. (1998) establish a similar characterization in a continuous setting.
We conclude with a remark on how the voting problem studied in this paper can be considered further. Our results provide characterizations of all strategy-proof SCFs for constrained multiple public good votings for the three important domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences. Even though these domains of separable preferences are considered frequently in the literature, they are only particular cases of domains of separable preferences. More generally, one can define a domain P S A of separable preferences over A by specifying a set S ⊂ 2 M of subsets of M, and letting P S A be the set of all preferences over A which are separable with respect to every S ∈ S. 8 It would then be interesting to find characterizations of all strategy-proof SCFs f : (P S A ) n → A for an arbitrary separability structure S. 9 Obviously, such a characterization must depend on the interplay between S and the maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q , and generalizing the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 and 3, it can be shown that if q ≥ 2, then there exist non-dictatorial strategy-proof SCFs f : (P S A ) n → A, which are voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and component-wise dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, if and only if every P ∈ P S A has a well-defined top element in every component B j (i.e., independently of which elements are chosen from the other components). This condition is of course met when preferences are componentwise separable, which is the content of Theorem 2, but C(B j ) ∈ S for all j is only a sufficient, but not necessary condition to avoid a purely dictatorial result, which is illustrated in the following example.
8 Not all S ⊂ 2 M can be used to define a domain P S A of separable preferences because separability with respect to certain groups of categories may imply separability also with respect to other groups of categories. For example, when every A k is finite, then any preference which is separable with respect to S, T ∈ S is also separable with respect to S ∩ T , i.e., S must be closed under intersections (Bradley, 2005, Proposition 4 .2). In the "continuous" case, S must in addition also be closed under unions, differences, and symmetric differences (Gorman, 1968) . 9 A similar problem has been studied in Le Breton and Sen (1999) , but from the following different perspective: In a model where #A k ≥ 3 for all k ∈ M and R f = A (i.e., range restrictions are not permitted), they consider the special case when S is an arbitrary partition of M, which moreover can be different for different individuals, and they find that strategy-proof SCFs must be categorywise dictatorial and in addition satisfy a condition which ensures consistency with the individual separability structures.
Example 7. Let A = {0, 1} 4 , and define P S A by S = {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} .
Further, let B = B 1 × B 2 , where B 1 = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} and B 2 = {0, 1}. Then every P ∈ P S A ranks (1, 0, 0) ∈ B 1 and (0, 1, 0) ∈ B 1 independently of whether 0 or 1 is chosen from B 2 , because {1, 2} ∈ S implies that (1, 0, 0, 0) P (0, 1, 0, 0) if and only if (1, 0, 0, 1) P (0, 1, 0, 1) . Similarly, since {1, 3} ∈ S and {2, 3} ∈ S, also (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) as well as (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) are ranked independently of the choice from B 2 . From this it follows that the top of P in B 1 does not depend on the choice from B 2 . Further, since {4} ∈ S, also the top in B 2 is independent of the choice from B 1 . Therefore, it is possible to construct non-dictatorial (componentwise) strategy-proof SCFs f : (P S A ) n → A, whose range equals B. Note, however, that this non-dictatorial result holds even though there exist preferences P ∈ P S A which are not separable with respect to C(B 1 ) = {1, 2, 3}. For example, it is straightforward to check that P defined by
A , but since (0, 1, 1, 0) P (1, 0, 0, 0) while (1, 0, 0, 1) P (0, 1, 1, 1), it follows that C(B 1 ) / ∈ S. 10 Example 7 shows that component-wise separability is not necessary for the existence of a non-dictatorial strategy-proof SCF. However, we do not think that there exists a simple condition to decide whether a given combination of a separability structure S and a maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q admits non-dictatorial decomposable strategy-proof SCFs.
Appendix: The proofs
This appendix provides the proofs of Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. If P ∈ P add A , then for every j (1 ≤ j ≤ q), π B j (τ R f (P)) is the well-defined most preferred element of P in B j , independently of which element in B − j it is combined with. Hence, if f : (P add A ) n → A is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, then f is strategy-proof.
For the only if -part, assume now that f is strategy-proof. In the following, we employ Theorem 1 in Barberà et al. (2005) as indicated in Example 3, and we divide the proof into six steps.
Step 1: It suffices to prove the only if-part for SCFs which are weakly onto. 11
Assume that the only if -part has already been proved for all weakly onto SCFs, and consider some SCF f : (P add A ) n → A which is not weakly onto. This means that there is some category Aˆk and someâˆk ∈ Aˆk such thatâˆk / ∈ π Ak (R f ). 12 Every profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ (P add A ) n of additive preferences can be identified with a profile (∑ k∈M u 1k , . . . , ∑ k∈M u nk ) of corresponding additive utility functions, and f can hence be considered as a function of the numbers {u ik (a l k )} i∈N, k∈M, 1≤l k ≤#A k . However, sinceâˆk / ∈ π Ak (R f ), f must be independent of the numbers {u ik (âˆk)} i∈N , because if there existed P i , P i ∈ P add A and P −i ∈ (P add A ) n−1 such that P i and P i rank all a ∈ R f identically but f (P i , P −i ) = f (P i , P −i ), then individual i would be able to manipulate f either at (P i , P −i ) or at (P i , P −i ). SetÂˆk = Aˆk \ {âˆk} and A = A 1 × · · · ×Âˆk × · · · × A m , and letf :
. Thenf is strategy-proof because f is strategy-proof, and moreover, since Rf = R f ,f and f have the same maximal range decomposition. Iff is weakly onto,f is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, and f must then have the same properties. Iff is not weakly onto, continue eliminating alternatives which cannot be elected until a weakly onto SCF is obtained. Hence, it suffices to prove the only if -part for weakly onto SCFs.
Step 2: Define a binary transformation T A of A. a 1 ) , . . . , T m (a m )). Note that T A is injective, and for all a ∈ A, T A (a) contains exactly m ones, the other entries being zero.
Step 3: Define a surjective mapping Q : P add A → P add A that preserves the ranking of alternatives inĀ and A which correspond to each other under T A .
ForP ∈ P add A , define the preference Q(P) on A by setting a Q(P) a for a, a ∈ A if and only if T A (a)P T A (a ). To show that Q(P) ∈ P add A , suppose thatP is represented by the utility functionū = ∑
: {0, 1} → R, and after a linear 11 An SCF f : P n A → A is weakly onto if {π A k (a); a ∈ R f } = A k for every k ∈ M. 12 Here, the following convention is used: When ϕ : X → Y is a mapping and Z ⊂ X, then ϕ(Z) denotes the set ϕ(Z) = {ϕ(x); x ∈ Z}.
transformation ofū if necessary, we can assume thatū k (T A (a) ), so u is an additive representation of Q(P). Furthermore, sinceP is asymmetric, also Q(P) is asymmetric. Hence, Q(P) ∈ P add A . It remains to show that Q is surjective. Consider some arbitrary but fixed P ∈ P add A , and let P be represented by u = ∑ m k=1 u k , where u k : A k → R for k ∈ M. Since every A k is finite, we can, after small adjustments, assume that every u k takes values only in Q, and after multiplying u by a convenient factor, every u k can in fact be assumed to be integer-valued. Define now for every k ∈ M and 1 ≤ l k ≤ α k utility functionsū k l k : {0, 1} → R by settingū k l k (0) = 0 and 13
and letP be that preference onĀ which is represented by the utility functionū = (5) work as tie-breaking device and ensure thatP is asymmetric. Hence,P ∈ P add A . Since ∑ Z z=1 2 −z < 1 for every Z < ∞, we have u(a) > u(a ) if and only ifū(T A (a)) >ū(T A (a )) for all a, a ∈ A. Therefore, Q(P) = P, and Q is surjective.
Step 4: Associate to f : (P add A ) n → A a strategy-proof SCFf :
Define the SCFf : (P add A ) n →Ā byf (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) = T A ( f (Q(P 1 ), . . . , Q(P n ))) for all (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) ∈ (P add A ) n . Then for all (P i ,P −i ) ∈ (P add A ) n andP i ∈ P add A , we have 14
and since f is strategy-proof, it follows thatf is strategy-proof.
Step 5: Let R f = B 1 × · · · × B q be the unique maximal decomposition of R f according to Svensson and Torstensson (2008, Proposition 1) . If the binary transformation corresponding to the categories covered by B j (1 ≤ j ≤ q) are denoted by T B j :
From the definition off , it follows that Rf = T A (R f ) = T B 1 (B 1 ) × · · · × T Bq (B q ). It remains to show that T B 1 (B 1 ) × · · · × T Bq (B q ) cannot be decomposed further. Suppose, therefore, in order to obtain a contradiction, that for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ q) there exists a decomposition T B j (B j ) =B 1 j ×B 2 j . Consider some k ∈ C(B j ). For everyb j ∈ T B j (B j ), exactly one of the coordinates inb j corresponding to A k equals 13 For k = 1, we use in (5) the convention ∑ 0 k =1 α k = 0. 14 Making slight abuse of notation, Q(P −i ) denotes here the profile obtained when Q is applied to every preference inP −i . 1, and conversely, since f is weakly onto, for every coordinate in T B j (B j ) corresponding to A k there is someb j ∈ T B j (B j ) for which this coordinate is equal to 1. Therefore, the coordinates in T B j (B j ) which correspond to A k must either belong completely toB 1 j or completely toB 2 j . This means that T B j can be written as
is the binary transformation of the categories A k which belong toB s j (s = 1, 2). But then B j = (T 1
) −1 (B 2 j ), which contradicts the assumption that R f = B 1 × · · · × B q is the maximal decomposition of R f . Thus, Rf = T B 1 (B 1 ) × · · · × T Bq (B q ) must be the unique maximal decomposition of Rf .
Step 6: Apply Theorem 1 in Barberà et al. (2005) tof , and translate the structure off to f .
By Theorem 1 in Barberà et al. (2005) ,f is voting by committees on T B j (B j ) with #T B j (B j ) = 2 and dictatorial on T B j (B j ) with #T B j (B j ) ≥ 3. To show that f has a corresponding structure, consider first some component B j with #B j = 2. Thenf is voting by committees on
for all (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) ∈ (P add A ) n and b j ∈ B j ; since further π B j ( f (Q(P 1 ), . . . , Q(P n ))) = b j if and only if π T B j (B j ) (f (P 1 , . . . ,P n )) = T B j (b j ) and Q is surjective, the winning coalitions for T B j (b j ) underf must be exactly the same as the winning coalitions for b j under f . Thus, f is voting by committees on B j . By a similar argument it follows that if #B j ≥ 3, then f is dictatorial on B j .
In the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we will use the following monotonicity property of strategy-proof SCFs, which is frequently used in the literature and goes back to Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) .
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). Let P A be a domain of complete, transitive, and asymmetric preferences over a set A, and suppose that f : P n A → A is a strategy-proof SCF. If f (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = a for some profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A , and (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A is such that a P i a implies a P i a for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A, then also f (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = a.
Proof of Theorem 2. If f is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, then it follows by the same argument as in the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1 that f is strategy-proof.
For the only if -part, assume now that f is strategy-proof. Letf : (P add A ) n → A be the restriction of f to profiles of additive preferences. Since f is strategy-proof, alsô f is strategy-proof. Moreover, Rf = R f , because if a ∈ R f so f (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = a for some (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P n A , we can pick some P a ∈ P add A with τ A (P a ) = a and get by Lemma 1 thatf (P a , . . . , P a ) = a. In particular, this means thatf has the same maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q as f . By Theorem 1,f is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3, and we show now that this functional structure extends to f .
Consider first some component B j with #B j ≥ 3, and let individual i be the dictator associated with B j byf , that is, π B j (f (P i , P −i )) = π B j (τ Rf (P i )) for all (P i , P −i ) ∈ (P add A ) n . Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that individual i is not a dictator on B j under f , i.e., there is some profile
A with τ A (P ) =ā, and setP −i = (P , . . . ,P ) ∈ (P add A ) n−1 . By Lemma 1, f (P i ,P −i ) =ā. Letā ∈ R f be the alternative which satisfies π B j (ā ) = π B j (τ R f (P i )) and π −B j (ā ) = π −B j (ā). SinceP i is separable with respect to C(B j ), we haveā P iā . If nowP i ∈ P add A is such that τ A (P i ) =ā , then f (P i ,P −i ) =f (P i ,P −i ) =ā , which contradicts strategyproofness of f at (P i ,P −i ). Thus, individual i must be a dictator on B j under f .
Consider now some component B j with #B j = 2, and let
be the winning coalitions for b s j underf (s = 1, 2). Using arguments similar to those in the preceding paragraph, we will show that the same coalition structure applies for f on B j . Suppose therefore that there exists some profile (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) ∈ P n A such that the coalitionW = {i ∈ N; π B j (τ R f (P i )) = b 1 j } belongs to W b 1 j , but f (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) =ā and π B j (ā) = b 2 j . LetP ∈ P add A be such that τ A (P ) =ā, and setP −W = (P , . . . ,P ) ∈ (P add A ) n−#W . Then, by Lemma 1, f (PW ,P −W ) =ā. Set furtherā = (b 1 j ,ā − j ), and note thatā ∈ R f andā P iā for every i ∈W . Let P ∈ P add A be such that τ A (P ) =ā , and setP W = (P , . . . ,P ) ∈ (P add A ) #W . Then f (P W ,P −W ) =f (P W ,P −W ) =ā . But this means that if we replace the preferences from (PW ,P −W ) to (P W ,P −W ) successively one at a time, there must be some i ∈W who can manipulate f . Hence, every W ∈ W b 1 j is a winning coalition for b 1 j under f , and by symmetry, a corresponding statement must be true for every W ∈ W b 2 j . Thus, f is voting by committees on B j .
Proof of Theorem 3.
(1) The case q = m is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
(2) For the case q < m, note first that a dictatorial SCF obviously is strategy-proof. For the converse implication, assume now that f : (P ws A ) n → A is strategy-proof. To begin with, we consider only the case when n = 2. Letf : (P cs A ) 2 → A be the restriction of f : (P ws A ) 2 → A to completely separable preferences. Since f is strategyproof, it follows immediately that alsof is strategy-proof. Moreover, Rf = R f , because if a ∈ R f so f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a for some (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ (P ws A ) 2 , we can pick some P a ∈ P cs A with τ A (P a ) = a and get by Lemma 1 thatf (P a , P a ) = a. In particular, this means thatf has the same maximal range decomposition B 1 × · · · × B q as f . By Theorem 2,f is voting by committees on every B j with #B j = 2 and dictatorial on every B j with #B j ≥ 3. Since q < m, the maximal range decomposition B 1 ×· · ·×B q must contain some component, say B 1 , such that #C(B 1 ) ≥ 2. We now consider the two cases #B 1 ≥ 3 and #B 1 = 2 separately.
CASE 1: #B 1 ≥ 3.
If #B 1 ≥ 3, thenf is dictatorial on B 1 , and assume without loss of generality that i = 1 is the dictator associated with B 1 . Introduce first some simplifying notational conventions: Assume that the categories in A = A 1 × · · · × A m are ordered in such a way that all categories belonging to B 1 are collected leftmost in A, then all categories belonging to B 2 follow, and so on; formally, this means that if k ∈ C(B j ) and k ∈ C(B j ), then j < j implies k < k . In order to define preferences on A in a convenient way below, identify each A k with the integer interval {0, 1, . . . , #A k − 1}. Further, assume without loss of generality that b • j ≡ (0, . . . , 0) ∈ B j for all j ≥ 2. Note also that since #C(B 1 ) ≥ 2, there must be some b
, and assume that b • 1 ≡ (0, . . . , 0). Suppose further that the categories A k belonging to B 1 are ordered in such a way that, among the elements in B 1 with maximal number of zeros, there is at least one elementb 1 such that all zeros are collected "rightmost" in b 1 , and denote the set of allb 1 with the precisely described property byB 1 ; formally,
In the following, we show that i = 1 must be a dictator forf ; from this follows then almost directly that i = 1 is also a dictator for f . In order to obtain a contradiction, assume now that there is some component B j for which i = 1 is not a dictator underf ; we prove now in five steps that it is then possible to construct a profile at which f is manipulable.
Step 1: Define preferencesP 1 ∈ P ws A \ P cs A andP 2 ,P 2 ∈ P cs A .
Let α ≡ max k∈M {#A k }, and define for i = 1 the preferenceP 1 ∈ P ws A \ P cs A by the utility function
Intuitively,P 1 is lexicographic on B 2 × · · · × B q with priority decreasing from the right to the left; moreover, the component B 1 has least priority and the priority order within B 1 depends on whether b −1 = (0, . . . , 0). Let π B 1 (P 1 |b −1 ) be the marginal preference ofP 1 on B 1 conditional on that
, and note thatb 1 ∈B 1 . Define furtherb 1 ≡ τ B 1 (π B 1 (P 1 |b −1 )) for b −1 = (0, . . . , 0), and note that we must have π A 1 (b 1 ) = 0, and thusb 1 =b 1 because π A 1 (b 1 ) = 0.
Next, letP 2 ∈ P cs A be the lexicographic preference on A given by the utility functionū 2 (a) = − ∑ m k=1 a k α m−k , whose priority thus is decreasing from the left to the right.
Finally, to defineP 2 , consider each component B j in B 1 ×· · ·×B q on which i = 1 is not a dictator underf . If #B j ≥ 3, then i = 2 must be a dictator on B j underf , and let in this caseb j ∈ B j be some arbitrary element in B j withb j = (0, . . . , 0). If #B j = 2, then there must be at least oneb j ∈ B j for which {2} is a winning coalition underf , and assume without loss of generality thatb j = (0, . . . , 0). In both cases, we get that if P 2 ∈ P cs A is such that π B j (τ R f (P 2 )) =b j , then π B j (f (P 1 , P 2 )) =b j for all P 1 ∈ P cs A . Let nowP 2 ∈ P cs A be such that π B j (τ R f (P 2 )) =b j on every B j on which i = 1 is not a dictator.
Step 2: f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = τ R f (P 1 ), and in particular π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b 1 .
, because on B 1 , i = 1 is a dictator, and on B j with j ≥ 2, we have the unanimous vote π B j (τ R f (P 1 )) = π B j (τ R f (P 2 )) = (0, . . . , 0). Hence, by Lemma 1, f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = τ R f (P 1 ).
Step 3: For j ≥ 2, π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B j (f (P 1 ,P 2 )) for all P 1 ∈ P cs A with τ R f (P 1 ) = τ R f (P 1 ). 15 Consider first a component B j on which i = 1 is not a dictator underf . Then π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b j for all P 1 ∈ P cs A . If now π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b j =b j , then i = 1 would be able to manipulate f at a profile (P 1 ,P 2 ), where P 1 ∈ P cs A is some lexicographic preference which gives highest priority to the categories belonging to B j and which satisfies π B j (τ A (P 1 )) =b j . Thus, π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B j (f (P 1 ,P 2 )) for all B j on which i = 1 is not a dictator.
Consider now components B j on which i = 1 is a dictator underf . Let B j * be the first component from the right in B 1 × · · · × B q such that i = 1 is a dictator on B j * underf , but π B j * ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B j * (τ R f (P 1 )) = (0, . . . , 0). If P 1 ∈ P cs A is such that τ A (P 1 ) = τ R f (P 1 ), then π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) for all j > j * by the preceding paragraph, but π B j * ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = (0, . . . , 0), and thus i = 1 would be able to manipulate f at (P 1 ,P 2 ). Thus, there is no such B j * , and π B j ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = π B j (f (P 1 ,P 2 )) also holds for all B j on which i = 1 is a dictator.
Step 4: π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b 1 .
From the assumption that i = 1 is not a dictator on all B j with j ≥ 2 and Step 3, it follows that π B −1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) = (0, . . . , 0), and hence the top alternative ofP 1 in B 1 conditional on π B −1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) isb 1 . Therefore π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b 1 , because otherwise i = 1 would be able to manipulate f by representing some P 1 ∈ P cs A whose top satisfies π B 1 (τ A (P 1 )) =b 1 and π B −1 (τ A (P 1 )) = π B −1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )).
Step 5: f (P 1 ,P 2 )P 2 f (P 1 ,P 2 ).
The preceding three steps imply that π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b 1 and π B 1 ( f (P 1 ,P 2 )) =b 1 . SinceP 2 is lexicographic with highest priority given to A 1 , and since π A 1 (b 1 ) = 0 while π A 1 (b 1 ) = 0, we have f (P 1 ,P 2 )P 2 f (P 1 ,P 2 ).
Since
Step 5 contradicts the strategy-proofness of f , the assumption that i = 1 is not a dictator forf must have been wrong, and we conclude thatf (P 1 , P 2 ) = τ R f (P 1 ) for all (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ (P cs A ) 2 . The final step is to show that i = 1 is also a dictator for f . Suppose therefore there is some profile (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ (P ws A ) 2 such that f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a = τ R f (P 1 ). If P 2 ∈ P cs A is such that τ A (P 2 ) = a, then f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a by Lemma 1. But then i = 1 can manipulate f at (P 1 , P 2 ) by representing some P 1 ∈ P cs A with τ A (P 1 ) = τ R f (P 1 ) because f (P 1 , P 2 ) =f (P 1 , P 2 ) = τ R f (P 1 ). Thus, i = 1 must be a dictator for f . CASE 2: #B 1 = 2.
Consider now the case when #B 1 = 2, and let B 1 = {b 1 1 , b 2 1 }. Iff : (P cs A ) 2 → A is, as above, the restriction of f to completely separable preferences, thenf is by Theorem 2 voting by committees on B 1 , and there are two cases to consider.
(1) Iff is dictatorial on B 1 , it follows by exactly the same arguments as in Case 1 thatf and hence also f must be dictatorial.
(2) Iff is not dictatorial on B 1 , then one of the two alternatives in B 1 is chosen if and only if both individuals vote for it, and suppose without loss of generality that π B 1 (f (P 1 , P 2 )) = b 2 1 if and only if π B 1 (τ Rf (P 1 )) = π B 1 (τ Rf (P 2 )) = b 2 1 , and π B 1 (f (P 1 , P 2 )) = b 1 1 otherwise. In order to replicate the arguments above, set b 1 ≡ b 1 1 andb 1 ≡ b 2 1 . Let A k with k ∈ C(B 1 ) be identified with integer intervals {0, 1, . . . , #A k − 1} in such a way that ifP 2 ∈ P cs A is defined as in Step 1 above, then π B 1 (τ Rf (P 2 )) =b 1 . Further, chooseP 2 ∈ P cs A as in Step 1 above with the additional requirement that π B 1 (τ Rf (P 2 )) =b 1 . Then both π B 1 (f (P 1 ,P 2 )) and π B 1 (f (P 1 ,P 2 )) must be equal to π B 1 (τ Rf (P 1 )) for all P 1 ∈ P cs A , exactly as if i = 1 would have been a dictator forf on B 1 , and we can therefore apply the same arguments as in the five steps above to obtain the contradiction that i = 2 can manipulate f . Thus, also when #B 1 = 2, f : (P ws A ) 2 → A must be dictatorial. We use now an induction argument to prove the theorem for general n. Assume thus that n ≥ 3, and suppose that the theorem has already been proved for all n < n. Let f : (P ws A ) n → A be a strategy-proof SCF with #R f ≥ 3. Definef : (P ws A ) 2 → A bŷ f (P 1 , P 2 ) = f (P 1 , . . . , P 1 , P 2 ), where P 1 thus is replicated n − 1 times in the argument of f . Note that Rf = R f , because if a ∈ R f and P a ∈ P ws A is such that τ A (P a ) = a, thenf (P a , P a ) = a as a consequence of Lemma 1, and hence a ∈ Rf ; in particular, #Rf ≥ 3. Note further thatf is strategy-proof: To see thatf is strategy-proof in its first argument, let P 1 , P 1 , P 2 ∈ P ws A be arbitrary but fixed. For η = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, define the coalitions W η = {1, . . . , η} ⊂ N and W η = {η + 1, . . . , n − 1} ⊂ N with the convention W 0 = W n−1 = ∅, and set P W η = (P 1 , . . . , P 1 ) ∈ (P ws A ) η and P Wη = (P 1 , . . . , P 1 ) ∈ (P ws A ) n−η−1 . Further, set a η = f (P W η , P Wη , P 2 ) for η = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, and note that a 0 =f (P 1 , P 2 ) and a n−1 =f (P 1 , P 2 ). Since f is strategy-proof, we must have either a η−1 P 1 a η or a η−1 = a η for η = 1, . . . , n − 1. By transitivity it follows that eitherf (P 1 , P 2 ) P 1f (P 1 , P 2 ) orf (P 1 , P 2 ) =f (P 1 , P 2 ), which means that f is strategy-proof in its first argument. It follows further directly from the strategyproofness of f thatf is also strategy-proof in its second argument. By the induction hypothesis,f is thus dictatorial, and we consider the two cases when the dictator of f isî = 1 andî = 2.
Suppose first thatî = 1 is the dictator forf . Take some arbitrary but fixed P n ∈ P ws A and definefP n : (P ws A ) n−1 → A byfP n (P 1 , . . . , P n−1 ) = f (P 1 , . . . , P n−1 ,P n ). Since f is strategy-proof, it follows immediately that alsofP n is strategy-proof. Further, RfP n = R f , because if a ∈ R f and P a ∈ P ws A is such that τ A (P a ) = a, then fP n (P a , . . . , P a ) =f (P a ,P n ) = a. By the induction hypothesis,fP n is dictatorial, and it remains to show that the identity of the dictator offP n does not depend on the choice ofP n ∈ P ws A . Suppose, therefore, that there existP n ,P n ∈ P ws A such that individual i is the dictator forfP n while individual i (i = i) is the dictator forfP n . If P i , P i ∈ P ws A are now chosen such that τ R f (P i ) = τ R f (P n ) while τ R f (P i ) = τ R f (P n ), then this would imply that individual n would be able to manipulate f at (P 1 , . . . , P i , . . . , P i , . . . ,P n ) by representingP n instead ofP n . Thus, the identity of the dictator offP n must be independent ofP n , and it follows that f is dictatorial.
Consider finally the case whenî = 2 is the dictator forf . In this case, individual n must be a dictator for f , which follows from a contradiction argument: If there were some (P n , P −n ) ∈ (P ws A ) n such that f (P n , P −n ) = a but a = τ R f (P n ), we could take some P a ∈ P ws A with τ A (P a ) = a and set P −n = (P a , . . . , P a ). Then f (P n , P −n ) = a by Lemma 1, but sinceî = 2 is a dictator forf , we also have f (P n , P −n ) =f (P a , P n ) = τ R f (P n ), which is a contradiction.
